IEEE's vulnerability footprint centers on widely adopted wireless and networking standards such as 802.11 and FireWire, where the disclosures reflect the protocol-level nature of the affected specifications rather than a traditional vendor product line. The recurring weakness classes—authentication bypass by spoofing, improper length-parameter handling, and use of broken or risky cryptographic algorithms—characterize the inherent challenges of designing secure wireless and interconnect protocols. Live severity, exploitation, and exposure counts are shown alongside this summary.
The number and severity of CVEs published that impact products developed by Ieee over time
Signals from CVEs in this vendor scope (10 CVEs).
10 CVEs · Highest risk first
| CVE | Published | CVSS | Risk | KEV | Exploit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2022-47522HIGH The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, se | Apr 15, 2023 | 7.5 | 25 | NO | NO |
CVE-2021-27861MEDIUM Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers) | Sep 27, 2022 | 4.7 | 20 | NO | NO |
CVE-2021-27854MEDIUM Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers, LLC/SNAP headers, and converting frames from Ethernet to Wifi and | Sep 27, 2022 | 4.7 | 20 | NO | NO |
CVE-2021-27853MEDIUM Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard or ARP inspection can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers and LLC/SNAP headers. | Sep 27, 2022 | 4.7 | 20 | NO | NO |
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header | May 11, 2021 | 3.5 | 18 | NO | NO |
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory af | May 11, 2021 | 3.5 | 18 | NO | NO |
CVE-2004-1038HIGH A design error in the IEEE1394 specification allows attackers with physical access to a device to read and write to sensitive memory using a modified FireWire/IEEE 1394 client, thu | Mar 1, 2005 | 7.2 | 18 | NO | NO |
CVE-2004-0459MEDIUM The Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) algorithm in the IEEE 802.11 wireless protocol, when using DSSS transmission encoding, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a | Jul 7, 2004 | 5.0 | 15 | NO | NO |
CVE-2021-27862MEDIUM Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length and Ethernet to Wifi frame conversion (and optionally VLAN0 | Sep 27, 2022 | 4.7 | 14 | NO | NO |
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under | May 11, 2021 | 2.6 | 14 | NO | NO |
Signals from CVEs in this vendor scope (10 CVEs).
An overview of all social media posts that mention a CVE ID that affects a product developed by Ieee.
Media articles that mention a CVE ID that affects a product developed by Ieee — matched by CVE ID, not by vendor name.